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Abstract 
 
Aim: Political decisions usually emerge from the competing interests of politicians, voters, 
and special interest groups. We investigated the applicability of an advanced methodological 
concept to determine whether certain institutional positions in a cooperating network have 
influence on the decision-making procedures. To that end, we made use of the institutional 
network of relevant health care and health governance institutions, concentrated in Belgrade, 
Serbia.  
Methods: We used a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based on a combination of meas-
ures for centrality in order to evaluate the positions of 25 players in Belgrade‟s institutional 
network. Their directed links were determined by a simulated position approach employing 
the authors‟ long-term involvement. Software packages used consisted of Visone 2.9, 
UCINET 6, and KeyPlayer 1.44. 
Results: In our analysis, the network density score in Belgrade was 71%. The PCA revealed 
two dimensions: control and attractiveness. The Ministry of Health exerted the highest level 
of control but displayed a low attractiveness in terms of receiving links from important play-
ers. The National Health Insurance Fund had less control capacity but a high attractiveness. 
The National Institute of Public Health‟s position was characterized by a low control capacity 
and high attractiveness, whereas the National Drug Agency, the National Health Council, and 
Non-Governmental Organisations were no prominent players. 
Conclusions: The advanced methodologies used here to analyse the health care policy net-
work in Belgrade provided consistent results indicating that the intended decentralization of 
the health care network in Belgrade may be incomplete, still with low participation of civil 
society representatives. With the present study we set the stage for a broad-range survey-
based data collection applying the methodology piloted in Belgrade. 
 
Keywords: Belgrade‟s health care policy network, policy analysis, Serbia, social network 
analysis, sources of power. 
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Introduction 
Political decisions are not primarily the result of scientific (rational) problem solving - like 
e.g. the illustration of the policy cycle suggests (1,2). The decisions usually will emerge from 
the competing interests of politicians, voters, and special interest groups. The policy literature 
considers this issue and suggests a variety of frameworks and analytic models for policy 
analysis (3). The spectrum ranges from the rather normative scientific problem solving ap-
proach to a more „incrementalistic‟ way (4). Lindblom even calls it „muddling through‟ (5) - 
and finally to the paradigm of „bounded rationality‟ (6,7). Analyzing decision outcomes 
(policies) has to consider the specific organisational structure (policy) and the initiated proc-
esses (politics), comparable to Donabedian‟s concept of structure and process as a prerequi-
site of outcome quality (8). Related questions are: How will political decision processes pos-
sibly influence policy-making (6)? Do certain individual or institutional positions in a coop-
erating network have more or less influence on the decision-making procedures?   
To explore the complex governmental portfolio of resources, Hood et al. (9,10) propose a 
classification scheme, which gets to the point with only four important sources of power: 
Nodality, Authority, Treasure and Organisation. They state that nodality denotes the property 
of being in the middle of an information or social network (10). A high degree of nodality 
gives a player a strategic position from which he allocates information, and which enables 
him to draw in information. Authority is the formal and legitimate official power (11). That is 
the formal power to demand, forbid, guarantee, and arbitrate. Treasure gives the government 
the ability to exchange goods, using the coin of money or something that has a money-like 
property. Finally, organisation gives to a government the physical ability to act directly, us-
ing its own forces (10).  
With the Serbian Health Insurance Act of 2005 (12) the Serbian government aimed at reo-
rienting the health care system and transform it into a more decentralised organisation. These 
changes would hopefully offer to the insured population an opportunity for a greater self-
management. As most of the relevant institutions are concentrated in the Serbian capital Bel-
grade, we used this example to investigate the applicability of the aforementioned methodo-
logical concept. With the disclosure of the players‟ nodalities that make up Belgrade‟s health 
care policy network, we envisaged to analyse to which degree the decentralisation of decision 
making has progressed since the legislation of 2005, extending our preliminary analysis (13). 
With the present step we focus on institutional players and their nodality only, without con-
sideration of potentially influential individual players. The analysis of Belgrade‟s health pol-
icy network is a pilot project appropriate for testing the feasibility of a countrywide survey. 
This analysis was based on a questionnaire survey.   
 
Methods 
To break down the abstract notion of power and influence, different paradigms were used in 
sociology and political science: reputation approach, decision approach, or position approach 
(14). For a critical review of the approaches see Domhoff (14). In our understanding, influen-
tial actors can be best described by the position approach, i.e. a policy network. A policy 
network is described by its various players - public as well as non-governmental - their for-
mal and informal connections and the specific boundary of the network under consideration. 
The links between the players are likely to be understood as communication channels for the 
exchange of information, expertise, trust and other policy resources (15). Depending on the 
scientific disciplines, e.g. coming from community power research (14), or systems thinking 
(16,17), various technical approaches and measures have been used to identify, describe and 
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analyse formal or informal networks within organisations. Necessary data can be collected by 
means of survey (questionnaires, interviews), observations, or by analysing secondary data. 
For economic reasons, a heuristic procedure as outlined e.g. by Vester (16) or Bryson (18) 
was applied and possible actors [so-called boundary specification (19, p. 77)] were enume-
rated in a brainstorming session listed in a “cross-impact matrix” of influences (16, p. 188). 
Finally, the strength and direction of their connections was estimated (16, p. 188) by the au-
thors for the purpose of this methodological study. These are “soft data” (16, p. 22), but nev-
ertheless they are based on experience, knowledge of the health care system and observa-
tions. As Newman points out, collecting data by directly questioning participants (or, players) 
does not necessarily provide a higher accuracy and is also a laborious endeavour (20). For 
visualisation of the network and a more in-depth analysis, we recurred to the analytic tools of 
Social Network Analysis (SNA). The concept of nodality corresponds well with the measures 
used in SNA and, basically, two viewpoints are possible: primarily focusing on a specific 
player (ego-centred) only, and analysing and evaluating the network as a whole, taking all 
connections and all players into account (socio-centred) (13).  
On a socio-centred level, the network structure can be described by measuring density and 
centralization. Centralization is defined as the variation in the centrality scores of the nodes 
or players in the network. This variation shows the extent to which there is a centre - i.e., very 
central players - and a periphery - i.e., players with very low centrality scores (21). Density is 
a basic network property that reflects the overall intensity of the connected players: the more 
connected the network, the greater its density. A dense network is one where a lot of activity 
or a large number of strong ties exist among its members (22). On an ego-centred (individual) 
level, we focused on the players‟ importance. Importance reflects the visibility to other net-
work members (23) and is broken down into indices like influence and prestige.  
 
Measures of centrality  
The concept of centrality is a crucial aspect when representing policy networks (24). Central-
ity measures will identify the most prominent players. These are the players who are exten-
sively involved in relationships with other network members (25) without necessarily dis-
criminating between formal or informal links (depending on the data collection approach). 
The most frequently centrality measures used include degree centrality, betweenness central-
ity, and closeness centrality. They reflect the view that information is transferred along the 
shortest pathways (26).  
 
Degree centrality is an indicator of expertise and is measured by the sum of all other players 
who are directly connected to a specific player (25). Asymmetric networks are particular in 
that the distinction between indegree-centrality and outdegree-centrality has to be taken into 
account (13). Players receiving many ties (indegree) have a high prestige (23). Players with a 
high flow of outgoing connections (outdegree) are able to exchange with many others, or - at 
least - make others aware of their views (13). This means that players with a high outdegree 
centrality are said to be influential players (27).   
 
Betweenness centrality counts how many times a player connects other players, who other-
wise would not be able to reach one-another (25). It measures the potential for control, be-
cause a player who shows a high betweenness degree will be able to operate as a gatekeeper 
by controlling the flow of resources between the other nodes that are connected through him 
(25) - on shortest paths (28). 
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Closeness centrality is based on the concept of distance. A player who is close to all others in 
the network, e.g. having a distance of no more than one, is not dependent on any other to 
reach everyone in the network (25). Closeness centrality measures independence or efficiency 
(25). In the context of SNA, efficiency means that the higher the closeness centrality of a 
node, the shorter is its average distance to any other node, thus indicating a better position for 
spreading information (29).  
 
Further centrality measures are hub function and authority. In directed networks, players that 
have important resources should get a high centrality score too. Newman defines it as fol-
lows: “Authorities are nodes that contain useful information on a topic of interest; hubs are 
nodes that tell us where the best authorities are to be found” (30, p. 179).  In the framework 
of SNA, formal authority has to be differentiated from informal authority (11). Hubs are en-
ablers of effective knowledge transfer (31, p. 225). A high hub player points to many impor-
tant authorities (high outdegree) whereas a high authority player receives ties from many im-
portant hubs (high outdegree).  They can effectively connect different sub-groups of the net-
work and facilitate knowledge flows; removing them from the network can lead to its frag-
mentation (31, p. 225).   
 
Study setting 
For investigating the applicability of the methodological concept we chose a position ap-
proach as it best describes the potential of power and influence, combined with a heuristic 
data collection. To that end, the authors - all well informed about the Serbian health care sys-
tem and the situation in Belgrade - listed 25 players, identified the links between the players 
and the perceived strength of their relationship together in an open process. As pointed out 
earlier (13), the links can point in one direction only (unidirectional), or include both direc-
tions (bidirectional). The strength of the relationship was rated on a scale ranging from 0 to 4. 
Very weak links with a value of 1 were put on a level with 0 for “no link” (13). The rating of 
the links reflects the averaged assessment of the authors. The resulting “cross-impact matrix” 
was exported to Visone 2.9 (15) for further analysis. In some cases where the analytic toolset 
of Visone 2.9 did not provide the calculation of specific indices, we used UCINET 6 (32), and 
KeyPlayer1.44 (33) instead. 
To visualise the analytical findings in an easily understandable format, we chose the design 
of a target diagram, which is also a built-in feature of Visone 2.9. In this diagram, the 25 
players (nodes) are placed according to their scores. This means that the player with the high-
est score is positioned in the centre of the diagram; the others, according to their decreasing 
scores, are moved toward the periphery of the structure, correspondingly. To ensure a largely 
undisturbed view, the authors of Visone 2.9 applied a specialized layout algorithm that aims 
at minimizing entanglement by reducing the number of crossing lines and occlusions deter-
mine the angular location. The different score levels are displayed as thin concentric circles. 
This allows comparing the scores of the players easily, without looking at the output table 
(15, p. 17). Brandes et al. (15) successfully used these diagrams to analyse local health poli-
cies and the underlying structure of the various players, e.g. to disclose the differences in the 
local drug policy of two German municipalities and the networks of players that form the 
basis of the policy making. Furthermore, to facilitate an overall perspective (holistic view) of 
the indices applied, we merged the results with the help of a Principle Component Analysis 
(PCA) diagram. PCA is a multivariate data analysis method which is used to reduce complex-
ity by transforming a set of possibly correlated variables into a set of uncorrelated variables, 
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i.e., principal components (34,35). This approach explains best the variance of data and helps 
to reveal the internal structure of the data. 
 
Results 
The network matrix was composed by 25 players and 158 directed and valued links or con-
nections as determined - for the purpose of this methodological study - by the authors. The 
network density was calculated as 71% realized links out of all possible ones. A density 
greater than 50% is considered high (36). Therefore, we assumed here that the players in Bel-
grade were well connected. For valued networks (see Figure 1), the centralization score has to 
be calculated separately for outdegree and indegree centrality. The outdegree score here was 
46.3% of all possible connections, whereas the indegree score was 19.1% (calculated with 
UCINET 6). This would disclose a distinct centralisation. However, the range of outdegree 
scores was larger than that of indegree scores, and the players showed a higher variability. 
The coefficient of variation was 93% for outdegree and 54% for indegree centrality, indicat-
ing that the network was less homogeneous with regard to outdegree centrality, or influence 
(27). The possible influence of the players in the network varied largely, i.e., the positional 
advantages were rather unequally distributed. 
 
 
 
 
The most important players – identified in terms of degree centrality (Figure 1a and Table 1) 
- were the National Health Insurance Fund [1], the Ministry of Health [15], the National 
Government [14], and the Medical Faculty, Belgrade [22]. The Health Insurance Fund [1] 
received most of the strongest [blue] links. The players with the highest indegree centrality or 
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prestige were the Clinical Hospital Centres, Belgrade [8], the Institute of Public Health, Bel-
grade [4], the National Health Insurance Fund [1], and the Clinical Hospital Centre of the 
Republic [7]. Players with the highest outdegree centrality or influence were the National 
Government [14], the Ministry of Health [15], the Medical Faculty, Belgrade [22], the State 
Revisor [18], and the National Health Insurance Fund [1]. 
 
Table 1. Ranking of players by centrality indices  
(based on percentages – for the numeric codes, see Table 3 in the annex) 
 
INDICES OF CENTRALITY 
Degree 
centrality  
Indegree 
centrality  
Outdegree 
centrality   
Betweenness  Closeness  Hub function Authority 
1 8 14 8 14 14 3 
15 4 15 15 15 15 8 
14 1 22 22 18 18 4 
22 7 18 7 22 1 7 
7 3 1 19 19 22 23 
8 5 17 1 7 17 1 
18 6 7 20 1 20 25 
5 23 20 11 20 7 9 
4 25 19 23 23 11 2 
17 9 11 5 17 19 10 
19 15 23 6 11 5 15 
20 23 8 9 16 23 6 
23 2 5 23 8 8 23 
6 10 16 18 10 10 5 
11 22 9 12 3 9 13 
3 12 6 17 9 16 17 
23 19 10 3 23 6 16 
9 13 4 4 21 2 19 
25 17 2 10 12 4 12 
2 11 12 2 5 23 22 
10 20 21 14 6 21 20 
12 16 23 16 2 12 11 
16 21 3 21 4 3 21 
13 18 25 25 25 25 18 
21 14 13 13 13 13 14 
 
 
With respect to the betweenness centrality, the Clinical Hospital Centres, Belgrade [8] were 
the most central players. The Ministry of Health [15], the Medical Faculty, Belgrade [22], the 
Clinical Hospital Centre of Serbia [7], and the Serbian Physicians Society [19] seemed to be 
very close to each-other, but located more to the margin. Players with a high degree of close-
ness were the National Government [14], the Ministry of Health [15], the State Revisor [18], 
the Medical Faculty, Belgrade [22], and the Serbian Physicians Society [19]. The picture 
changed when we looked at hub functions. As pointed out, hubs are enablers of effective 
knowledge transfer, they can effectively connect different sub-groups of the network and 
facilitate knowledge flows; removing them from the network can lead to its fragmentation 
(31, p. 225). Considering the hub function, the National Government [14] was in the most 
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favourable position (see figure 1b), followed by the Ministry of Health [15]. The National 
Health Insurance Fund [1] moved more to the periphery indicating a loss of importance for 
knowledge transfer. The State Revisor [18] and the MOF Budget Inspection [17] also moved 
more to the centre of the diagram.  
As Hannemann and Riddle note, the question of how structural positioning implicates power 
is still a matter of research and debate (34). To reduce the complexity, eventually sort out 
redundant information and get an integral view, we applied PCA which is displayed in Table 
2 and Figure 2.  
 
Table 2. Contribution of centrality measures to the dimensions of the PCA (percentages) 
 
CENTRALITY MEASURES  D1 (Control) D2 (Attractiveness) 
Degree 22.645 3.186 
Indegree 0.159 40.837 
Outdegree 22.820 3.876 
betweenness 12.246 7.907 
closeness 19.822 3.205 
Hub function 21.654 3.607 
authority 0.654 37.381 
 
 
The PCA provides evidence of two dimensions (Figure 2); they explain 88.81% of the data. 
The first dimension consists of degree, outdegree, closeness, and hub function. The second 
dimension consists of indegree and authority. The first dimension D1 represents the capacity 
for “Control”; the second dimension D2 depicts what we called “Attractiveness”.  
The main players: The Ministry of Health [15] - apart from the formal aspect i.e. legal author-
ity and organisation - was highly ranked on the first dimension of control. On the second di-
mension of attractiveness, it was ranked just above the average. This picture was confirmed 
in the classification by hub function and authority. The Ministry of Health was a hub as well 
as an authority in this analysis, whereas the hub feature was more pronounced. This would 
mean that it was connected to many popular players and received links from important play-
ers. The National Government [14] was likewise highly ranked on the first dimension, but 
showed the lowest score on the second dimension. This means that control was high but the 
attractiveness was low. On the other hand, the National Government [14] was also a hub, 
which means that it was connected to many very important players, and its influence might be 
based on this feature, primarily. The National Health Insurance Fund [1] showed less poten-
tial of control [first dimension] than the Ministry of Health [15], but had a higher score on the 
attractiveness axis [second dimension]. The National Health Insurance Fund [1] was a hub 
and an authority too. The hub score was lower than that of the Ministry of Health or the Na-
tional Government, but its authority score was very pronounced. This means, its authority 
feature - receiving links from important players – in our pilot study was more important.  
According to this analysis, effective decentralisation would require more autonomy for insti-
tutions like the National Institute of Public Health [3], the National Drug Agency [10], the 
National Health Council [13], and Non-Governmental Organisations [21], all ranking with 
the exception of the National Institute of Public Health [3] towards the end in Table 1 and 
low on both dimensions in Figure 2. But, also the Chambers of Health Professionals [11, 12] 
could play a more important role as well as the trade unions [20] and the branches of the Na-
tional Health Insurance Fund [2].  
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Figure 2. The position of players by two dimensions 
 
 
 
Legend: The yellow triangles mark the National Government and the Ministry of Health; the green 
diamonds signify the players focussed in the analysis; the blue circles represent the remaining players. 
For the numeric codes, see Table 3 in the annex. 
 
 
The National Institute of Public Health [3] ranked below average on the first dimension (con-
trol) and was positioned above average on the second dimension (attractiveness) that is play-
ers were seeking contact. Its high authority score confirmed this, but as a hub it ranked very 
low (Table 1). According to Borgatti, such players are primarily mediators (37).  
 
Discussion 
It is a widespread view in the literature that no single or generally accepted method for mea-
suring decentralization exists (38); there are many different definitions, understandings of the 
concepts and diverse measurement instruments (39). Thus, measuring centralization or decen-
tralization is mostly based on analyzing the financial autonomy or regulatory mechanisms 
(39,40). Independent of the underlying “intellectual tradition” (41), disciplinary and language 
differences, and the way the various indices were constructed, these approaches focus on 
formal aspects. Informal ways of influence and power are not taken into account. However, 
these informal relationships may superimpose the formal balance of power, supporting or 
even hindering structural changes or specific policy-making, and possibly will underestimate 
the real balance of power. The concept of nodalities, used here, is based on relationships 
(links). These links cannot only indicate subordination but can also stand for information 
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channels. Insofar, mapping the nodalities, is complementary to the approaches mentioned 
above and will round off the picture.  
Compared to other European countries, Serbia is among the most centralized systems (42). It 
ranks second on a list of thirteen countries (38). The analysis of the degree and appropriate-
ness of decentralization, however, is not an end in itself. It is a means to achieve a broader 
spectrum of goals (43) or, more generally speaking, it is an important component of good 
governance (38). Very often it is emphasized that decentralization is a very significant step in 
promoting democracy (44,45). With decentralization essential goals should be achieved, such 
as effectiveness and efficiency, fairness, quality, financial responsibility, and respect for local 
preferences (43,45). Decentralization is one of the most important issues on the agenda of 
health care reform in many countries. However, there is little information from research that 
can show the likely correlation between the degree of centralization and health outcomes, i.e. 
the health of the population (40). Furthermore, observations and case studies indicate that, if 
inadequately planned, and implemented, i.e. too rapidly or inconsistently, decentralization 
can have serious consequences on the provision of health services to the population (43). For 
that reason, appropriate planning, and considering corresponding experiences in other coun-
tries, may prevent disappointment and slow-down of processes. Decentralization also will 
shift the role of the Ministry of Health, from direct management and decision making toward 
formulating health care policies, technical counselling and assistance, as well as monitoring 
and evaluation of programmes and activities.    
Decentralization represents the transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions 
from the central to subordinate levels and/or to the private sector (43,45). The essential task, 
then, is to define the adequate level of decentralization (45) by entities, i.e., regions, districts, 
and municipalities, and by appropriate forms of bureaucratic autonomy, i.e. deconcentration, 
delegation, and devolution. Any consideration on whether decentralization is necessary and 
how much will be feasible has to undergo a detailed examination in the context of a (rational) 
organisational structure (46); this is very often perceived a common place, and ignored with 
associated consequences. Certain aspects of decentralization deserve closer attention. For 
example, the possibility of local authorities to adapt to local conditions should be carefully 
balanced against a common vision and the goals of the health care system (4). For this reason, 
the policy of decentralization should include mechanisms of coordination, since the local 
political interests grow as more responsibilities are transferred to that level (47). Furthermore, 
decentralization bears the risk of fragmenting responsibility for different types of health care 
(specialist hospitals, general hospitals, primary care etc.) between the levels of regional and 
municipal government (43). In this context, it is indicative that the coordinative and integra-
tive potential of the National Health Council of Serbia [13] seemingly is not used. This body 
could include Non-Governmental Organisations [21] in the field of health, as well as trade 
union representatives from the most important health institutions. 
The limitations of our approach relate to its validity and reliability. A valid model has to be 
isomorphic, thus representing a true picture of the system to be modelled. The level of iso-
morphism can be disclosed in analogy to the revision of „validity of structure and processes‟ 
(48), or „expert concurrence‟ (49). However, in this study the boundaries and the links remain 
to be crosschecked as a next research step, especially as the present dataset relies only on the 
author‟s evaluation of the situation. Missing data, i.e., the absence of players and/or links can 
also have an important impact (50,51) on the „application validity‟. Another criticism that 
raised concerns relates to the shortest paths-based measures as they do not take into account 
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diffusion along non-shortest paths (52). However, the modelling algorithms used here are 
consistent with validated standard computer software.  
In order to challenge the appropriate level and structure of a health care system and to control 
any process of reorganisation, it is essential to be fully familiar with the positive interaction 
of the various players. In this context, it is an important cornerstone to know the nodality of 
the health care network, in our example that of Belgrade hosting most of the national health 
institutions. The network depicted would also provide a basis for what-if-scenarios to antici-
pate the likely effects of intended changes. Furthermore, the methodology used for the net-
work and its description, which examines the system from a relatively high level (bird‟s eye 
view), can be adapted to specific decision-making situations, and tailored to support specific 
planning processes.   
 
Conclusion  
The advanced methodologies used here to analyse the health care policy network in Belgrade 
deliver consistent results indicating that the intended decentralization of the health care net-
work in Belgrade may be incomplete, still with low participation of civil society representa-
tives. With the present study we hope to prepare for a broad-range survey-based data collec-
tion and to apply the methodology piloted in Belgrade. 
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ANNEX 
Table 3. List of Players and their corresponding codes  
 
Work Code Full name 
1 National Health Insurance Fund 
2 NHIF, Belgrade Branch 
3 National Institute of Public Health 
4 Institute of Public Health, Belgrade 
5 Secretary for Health, Belgrade 
6 Primary Health Care Centres (17), Belgrade 
7 Clinical Hospital Centre of Serbia 
8 Clinical Hospital Centres (4), Belgrade 
9 National Accreditation Agency 
10 National Drug Agency 
11 National Chambers of Health Professionals 
12 Chambers of Health Professionals, Belgrade Branches 
13 National Health Council 
14 National Government  
15 Ministry of Health 
16 Ministry of Finance 
17 MOF Budget Inspection 
18 State Revisor 
19 Serbian Physicians Society 
20 Trade Unions 
21 Non-Governmental Organisations 
22 Medical Faculty, Belgrade 
23 Council of the Medical Faculty, Belgrade 
24 Special Hospitals, Belgrade 
25 Tertiary Medical Institutes, Belgrade 
___________________________________________________________ 
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